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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
STEVE AMICONE,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

KENNECOTT
TION,

vs.
COPPER

CORPORA-

Case No.
10736

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action was commenced by Appellant, Steve Amicone, who sought to establish that he was entitled to certain benefits under a retirement program created and maintained by Respondent, Kennecott Copper Corporation. The
basis for the claim was his contention that he was totally
and permanently disabled. The case was tried to a jury
and submitted on instructions and special interrogatories.
The answers to the interrogatories, as they were amplified
iJy the instructions, were favorable to the Respondent and
the District Court thereupon entered judgment in its favor.
By this appeal, Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Because Appellant's statement of facts fails to include
evidence which is necessary to a proper consideration of
the issue, Respondent makes this supplemental statement.
The provisions of the "Retirement Plan" administered
by Respondent, which are relevant to the points involving
disability are these :
An employee who is permanently and totally
disabled shall be retired from the service of the employing Company provided:
(a)

He has completed ten (10) or more years
of continuous service to the date that his
services ceased; and

(b)

His permanent and total disability has
been established in the opinion of a qualified physician, designated by the corporation.

Permanent and total disability is defined as follows:
" 'Permanent and Total Disability' for the purposes of the Plan means disability by bodily injury
or disease which prevents the Employee f rorn engaging in any occupation or employment whatsoei1er for remuneration or profit, and which disability, in the opinion of a qualified physician appointed by the corporation, will be permanent and
continuous during the remainder of the Employee's
lifetime, * * *" (Ex. P-1, p. 38) (Emphasis
ours.)
The Plan is "non-contributory" in that salaried employees are not required to make any contributions and all
monies used to pay benefits are furnished by Respondent.
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In addition, the nature of the undertaking and the rights
of the respective parties are founded in this language:
"11.1 This Plan is strictly voluntary on the
part of the Employing Companies and shall not be
deemed to constitute a contract between any one
or more of the Employing Companies and any Employee, nor to be a consideration for or an inducement or condition of the employment of any Employee. Nothing in this Plan shall be deemed to
give any Employee the right to be retained in the
service of an Employing Company nor to interfere
with the right of the Employing Company by which
he shall then be employed to discharge any Employee at any time."

"* * * 11.3 Except as provided in this
Plan, no Employee, prior to his retirement under
conditions of eligibility for pension benefits under
this Plan, shall have any right or interest whatsoever in or to any portion of any funds which may
be paid by an Employing Company into any Pension Trust or Trusts established for the purpose of
paying pensions." (Ex. P.-1, p. 53)
Appellant met the requirements of eligibility outlined
under sub-paragraph (a) of the Plan as quoted above since
he had been in the employ of Respondent for a period of
at least ten years prior to his termination.
By way of a preliminary approach to the problem, we
set out generally Appellant's employment record. He was
first employed by Respondent in 1936 and the relationship
was terminated on January 19, 1965 (Ex. P-3). During
this time, except for a four year period of military duty
(Tr. 64), he was employed at various positions with the
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company at its Bingham Canyon Mine, and, ultimately, its
Research Center in Salt Lake City, Utah (Tr. 64 through
70). In his earlier years with the company, Appellant was
employed as a worker on the "track gang" (Tr. 63), but
later he was transferred to the job of machinist helper,
which involved oiling, cleaning and refueling heavy machinery and bulldozers (Tr. 64). He was then a "toe
sampler" which required that he collect samples from the
various drill holes on different mine levels, and transport
them to the assay office for analysis (Tr. 65). In 1961, at
his own request, he was transferred from the Utah Copper
Division to the Kennecott Research Center located at the
University of Utah. The Research Center is a department
of the Western Mining Division and is disconnected from
the Utah Copper Division in areas concerning personnel
policies, hiring, and termination (Tr. 180). The job held
by the Appellant at the Research Center involved shoveling
of ore and moderately heavy lifting (Tr. 69-70).
The evidence concerning Appellant's asserted total and
permanent disability was substantially as follows: His
present physical condition arises from his difficulty with
a lumbar (low back) region. This originated in 1957 or
1958 (Tr. 67 & 68) and has continued, more or less constantly since that time (Tr. 68). In 1959 he was seen by
Doctor Jenkins and Dr. Sorenson, who in consultation with
Dr. Boyd G. Holbrook diagnosed his ailments and prescribed treatment. At that time, Dr. Holbrook suggested
that a fusion be performed, but Appellant would not agree
to such surgical procedure (Tr. 68). In June of 1963, he
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was operated on by Dr. Peter Lindstrom, who performed a
''laminectomy" and presumably removed one of Appellant's
intervertebral discs (Tr. 70, 120). No fusion was performed in this operation (Tr. 121-23).
The Appellant was subsequently treated by Dr. Mark
Gl'eene, an orthopedic surgeon, who treated him for a limitation of motion in the shoulder. In addition, Dr. Greene
made a diagnosis of the condition of Appellant's back (Tr.
141). The Appellant assumed an inactive status with the
company on June 18, 1964, to permit him to recuperate
from the surgery which had been performed on his shoulder (Tr. 136). On November 9, 1964, he filed with the
Company an application for retirement under the total and
permanent disability provisions of the plan (Ex. 7-D). He
was of the opinion, as certified in his application, that he
would be "unable to perform any work or engage in any
occupation or employment" for an indefinite period.
At the time of this application, the Appellant was examined by two physicians, who reported their evaluation
of his condition to the Respondent. The report of Dr. Mark
H. Greene, who was the Appellant's attending physician,
was submitted to Respondent on November 10, 1964 (Ex.
6-D). Disregarding his views on the injury to Appellant's
shoulder, he made the following prognosis and drew the
following conclusions:
"Back - prognosis poor. Patient, I believe is
eventually going to have to have further surgery
on the back to alleviate his difficulties."

6

"In my opinion, the disability of the Applicant
is such that he may engage in the following occupations or employments - any employment which
does not require heavy lifting or shoveling."
"In my opinion, the Appellant is not totally disabled * * *"
The other report was submitted by Dr. E. B. Kuhe,
on November 11, 1964. He stated that the Appellant never
would be able to do hard manual labor, but could perform
clerical work, light bench work, watchman or guard, and
concluded that:
"In my opinion, the applicant is not totally disabled."
On or about the 2nd day of January, 1965, Appellant
sought to return to his employment and in connection therewith, he had a conversation with his immediate supervisor
at the Kennecott Research Center. He was informed at
that time that there were no job vacancies at the Research
Center which the Appellant would be physically able to
perform (Tr. 180-181). This Center employs approximately 75 persons who for the most part are professionally
trained individuals and the Appellant had informed the
Center he needed lighter work than was available there.
Four days after Appellant's services with Respondent
were terminated, he joined a bowling league (Tr. 102).
During the remainder of the season, he bowled 42 games
with an average of 175 (Tr. 164). In October of 1965, the
Appellant obtained a job with the neighborhood youth corps
as a supervisor (Tr. 165-65). The salary for this job was
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approximately $425.00 per month (Tr. 164). He was able
to satisfactorily perform on that job for a period of two
and one half months, at the stated salary (Tr. 165). He
did not leave this job because of his incapacity to work,
but because of a new injury which occurred when he fell
nn a parking lot (Tr. 165) and for which he received payments under the Utah State Workmen's Compensation Act.
During this time that the Appellant was so employed, he
was not informed by his supervisor or employer that he
was unqualified or physically unable to perform the job
(Tr. 166) and they expressed interest in having him return
to work (Tr. 166). Appellant himself conceded on crossexamination that there were a number of jobs which are
within his physical and mental capabilities (Tr. 96-99).
In addition to the disability testimony previously
quoted, the following evidence is in the record:
Dr. Kuhe, stated that the Appellant should not do
heavy lifting, shoveling, lifting weights greater than 20
to 25 pounds or twisting such as a person wouU have to do
when shoveling. He stated further that the Appellant
rnuld perform all types of manual labor except for doing
those jobs which required stooping, lifting, and twisting
(Tr. 114). In his opinion, the Appellant could have worked
in such occupations as a janitor, truck driver, or similar
iobs (Tr. 114).
Dr. Holbrook stated that as far as Appellant's employability was concerned, it would appear that he should
fie able to carry out moderate types of activity which did
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not involve excessive stooping, lifting, or twisting. Asked
to enumerate some specific jobs which he felt the Appellant could fill, Dr. Holbrook stated that he could be employed as a salesman, a messenger, guard, truck driver and
that there were "thousands of jobs" that could be performed within this type of physical limitations (Tr. 129).
He defined total and permanent disability as follows:
"This means that a man cannot reasonably be
expected to be employable on a constant or average
market."
He joined with the other medical experts in the conclusion
that Appellant was not totally and permanently disabled
(Tr. 130).
Dr. Greene, an orthopedist, was the Appellant's personal physician. He stated that in his opinion, the Appellant was not totally and permanently disabled (Tr. 139)
and it was his conclusion that Appellant could perform
any type of occupation which did not require heavy lifting
(Tr. 144). Dr. Greene admitted that there were numerous
factors that went into the question of "total and permanent
disability" including the educational background, age, training, and experience of the patient (Tr. 148). However, in
forming his opinion that the Appellant was not totally and
permanently :iisabled, he took such factors into consideration (Tr. 150). Further evidence touching on Appellant's
physical condition will be stated under the particular point
involved.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL INTERROGATORIES COMPELLED THE TRIAL
COURT TO ENTER A JUDGMENT FOR RESPONDENT.
We have rephrased Appellant's Point I for he fails
on this appeal, as he did in the Court below, to recognize
a valid and critical distinction between the principles controlling this case and those governing contractual benefits
and obligations. His theory and approach is based upon
the premise that the Respondent's Retirement Plan is subject to the same rules of construction and operation as are
health and accident insurance policies. Thus, Appellant
places greight weight on some of the language found in
Colovas v. Home Life Insurance Company of New York,
28 P.2d 607, 83 Utah 401 (1934), and argues that it is
dispositive of the issues herein involved.
Respondent approaches the point on an entirely different basis and urges that the alleged parallel between the
"Plan" and the average health and accident insurance policy is based on a false premise; that there exists a most
basic and fundamental difference between the "Plan" and
the average insurance contract; that these distinctions require different legal consideration and rules of construction; and finally assuming without deciding that contractual principles govern, the appellant, nonetheless, is barred
from recovery.
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For the most part, contracts of insurance are prepare]
by the Insurance Company for the purpose of making a
profit and are bought and paid for by the insured. Moreover, insurance policies have from time to time been the
subject of questionable sales techniques and their wording,
sometimes referred to as the "fine print", frequently results in misleading an insured into believing that he has
acquired rights which are not included in the coverage of
the policy when carefully read. Because of such abuses,
the courts have construed the terms of that class of contracts strictly against the insurer in order to secure to the
insured the benefits which he was led to believe he was
entitld to and for which he paid his premiums. Thus, in
contract cases with ambiguous language we find numerous
rules of construction which give to the insured his full
measure of judicial protection.
For good reasons, the courts have taken a different
approach to pension or retirement programs such as the
one here in question. The entire burden of administering
and financing the plan is assumed by the Company and the
benefits are gifts to the employees. They do not contribute
funds and there is no trust established for their benefit.
Such a plan is a largesse and not a contract - as, indeed,
the plan itself specifically provUes (Ex. P-1, p. 53). There
is no requirement in law or equity which requires the Company to institute or maintain such a program and certainly,
all employees are happy with benefits offered to them at
no expense. Because of the benefactions bestowed by these
non-contributing programs, the courts have not saddled

11
tlte c1·eator with obligations which are not specifically and

clearly provided for, and particularly must a beneficiary
show he has met the qualifications to bring him within
tlw fold.
In Boyd \'. Operating Engineers, 193 Pa. Super. 438,
1G5 A.2d 289, 292 ( 1960); the Superior Court of Pennsyl-

vania stated:
"Here, however, we are dealing with the internal management of a union welfare fund and, in
view of the unique resolutions passed by it, the gcne1·al rules of insurance have no applicatfon.'' (Emphasis ours.)
In Nueffer v. Bo.kery & Confectionary Worke1·s, 193
F.Supp. 699, 700 (D. C. 1961); aff'd, 307 F.2d 671 (D. C.
Cir. 1962), citing another case, the court notes:
"It is there without doubt held that in any such
gratuitous pension plan there are none of the essential elements of a contract and the courts w'ill not
construe such a voluntary non-contributory plan
strictly against an empfoyr,r." (Emphasis ours.)

Menke v. Thompson, 140 F.2d 786, 791 (8th Cir. 1944) is
to the same effect:
"The contract here possessed none of the elements of a contract of insurance and is not to be
interpreted strictly against the railroad company,
especially since the burden it assumed was entirely
voluntary and gratuitous."
On the basis of such decisions, it is readily apparent that
the general rules of construction normally employed with
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regard to insurance contracts are inapplicable. Thus, it
would follow that Appellant's reliance upon cases such as
Colovas which create a contractual relationship is misplaced.
In light of the foregoing principles of interpretation
and construction, the issue on this appeal narrows to the
question of whether Appellant brought himself within the
class covered by the plan. As noted previously, one basic
condition precedent to qualification is that the employee
must show:
"His permanent and total disability has been
established in the opinion of a qualified physician
designated by the Company" (Ex. P-1, p. 38).
The evidence is undisputed and plethoric to support Respondent's contention that Appellant failed to satisfy such
condition. Three doctors - Kuhe, Greene and Holbrook
- each expressed their opinion that Appellant was not
totally and permanently disabled. Significantly, Appellant
failed to produce any testimony to contradict such opinions.
Appellant's failure to meet this condition was the keystone of Respondent's defense at trial. Moreover, assuming for the purpose of this discussion that the giving of
instructions was proper, the trial judge instructed the jury
as follows with respect to this condition:
"INSTRUCTION NO. 13

You are instructed that the plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his
permanent and total disability has been established
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in the opinion of a qualified physician designated
by the defendant and that in the opinion of a qualified physician appointed by the defendant the disability will be permanent and continuous during the
remainder of plaintiff's life" (R. 27). (Emphasis
ours.)
In light of the posture of the evidence and to give
effect to this instruction, the jury had to find that no doctor selected by Respondent had formed or expressed an
opinion that Appellant's disability was total. Since Appellant had failed to prove that he satisfied that basic requirement for eligibility under the plan, the Court entered
judgment for Respondent - no cause of action (Tr. 48).
Parenthetically, it is appropriate to note that Appellant
took no exceptions to either Instruction 13 or special Interrogatory No. 2 even though they clearly embodied the
theory advocated by Respondent throughout this entire
litigation.
ln further developing the law on gratuitous pension
plans, we mention that the necessity of having to comply
with conditions precedent before a right or privilege arises
is fundamental and elementary to contract law. Before
one may recover under the terms of a contract, he must
satisfy any conditions precedent specified therein. Otherwise, he does not bring himself within the reach of its proYi8ions and has no right to complain of a breach. Certainly
this basic principle shouU be applicable to a non-contributory, voluntary pension program. That precise question
has been considered by trial and appellate courts and there
is unanimity in their holding that an employer may pre-
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scribe such conditions precedent as it sees fit m such a
plan and the employee must qualify, if at all, under the
prescribed conditions.
One of the leading cases in this field is Menke v.
Thonipson, 140 F.2d 786 (8th Cir. 1944), involving a railroad company's pension plan, which, as in the instant case,
was voluntary and non-contributory. Concerning the employer's right to impose conditions precelent to eligibility.
the Court observed:
"The pension plan of appellee railroad company
was entirely voluntary, and its benefits were, as
declared in the plan, gratuities. No fund was established by the company and impressed with a
trust for the benefit of its employees. The right of
any employee to receive the pension provided was
not made dependent upon contributions by the employee to the expense of paying the pension or to
the expense of administering the pension plan. The
whole burden was borne by the company. No statute then in force required of the company the assumption of the burden which it took upon itself
in providing for pensions for its employees. It
therrfor'3 had the right, as the District Court correctly held, to condition its bounty in such manner
as it saw fit" ( 140 F.2d at 790). (Emphasis ours.)
To the same effect is the holding in Going v. Southern
Mill Employee's Trust, 281 P.2d 762, 763 (Okla. 1955),
wherein the Court stated:
"While this court has never before hai occasion to consider a profit sharing trust or any similar plan or arrangement, or to determine the rights
of any of the parties involved in such a plan, many
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of the other appellate courts in this country have
considered such plans and arrangements. From a
review of the opinions of those courts we conclude
that an employer who creates a profit sharing retire~nent plan for the benefit of his employees,
which plan is a voluntary one supported solely by
contributions from the employer, has the right to
prescribe the terms of the plan and the manner in
1vhich it shall be administered; and such terms as
a1'e prescribed are binding upon and determinative
of the rights of an employee o.sserting a right to
benefits thereunder." (Emphasis ours.)
In the case of In re Missou1·i Pacific Railroad Company, 49 F.Supp. 405, 406 (E.D. Mo. 1943), the court made
the following observation:
"The pension plan was a unilateral, voluntary
undertaking of the Missouri Pacific Railroad Company, and it was competent for the company to
make its bounty subject to whatever conditions it
chose anJ to reserve to itself the power to determine
whether such conditions had been met in any specific case."
Even if we went one step further and assumed arguPndo, that the Plan is contractual in nature, the result
would be the same. Considered in that light, it is only an
offer to form a unilateral contract wherein the Company
says, in effect: "If you fulfill the conditions, you receive
benefits." Under the law of contracts a contract is not
binding until conditions precedent have been fulfilled. This
Court has said as much in Driggs v. Utah Teachers Ret.
Br'd, 105 Utah 417, 435, 142 P.2d 657, 665 (1943). In that
instance, Justice Wolfe concurring in the result statej:
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"When the employer promises to his employee
prospective periodic payments to commence after
a certain term of service and upon fulfillment of
the conditions, it constitutes an off er 1vhich ripens
into a contract upon the fulfillment of those conditions * '' * " (Emphasis ours.)
Since Appellant cannot recover on a theory of breach of
contract, his cause must fail. It is not necessary, therefore,
to indulge in extended arguments about whethe1· the Plan
constitutes a conditional gift or a contract for in neither
event has Appellant any right of recovery.
Appellant seeks to strengthen his position by citing
authorities to the effect that a claimant is not bound by his
doctors' statements as the percentage of disability is a
question which should be submitted to the jury. His argument in support of this proposition finds its roots in the
insurance authorities such as Colovas, and Couch. As
previously noted, however, this is simply not an insurance
case and the rules of construction and interpretation cited
in those authorities are inapposite. In that connection, Respondent submits to the Court that the authorities which
should be considered in disposing of this question are those
dealing with plans similar to the one involved. Such cases
clearly hold that where authority is given to a board or
person to determine eligibility under a plan, the decision
of such board or person is conclusive in the absence of
fraud or bad faith. Respondent's plan provides that a doctor must determine whether total disability exists. He is
the appointed arbitrator whose decision is final and to
succeed in proving his case, Appellant had the burden of
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furnishing the Court with evidence that the arbitrator had
found in his favor. The plan itself could not be more specific in this regard for, it states:
"An employee is eligible 'provijed * * *
his permanent and total disability has been established in the opinion of a qualified physician designated by the Company'" (Ex. P-1, p. 38). (Emphasis ours.)
Under similar provisions, the cases are unanimous to the
effect that such a provision is valid and binding and failure
to meet the condition is fatal to recovery.
In the leading case of Menke v. Thompson, supra, at
p. 791, the Court discussed the problem :
"Appellant contends, however, that the pension
plan constitutej an offer by the company to its employees, which, when accepted and its conditions
met, resulted in a contract binding upon the company to pay the pension provided. Even so, Menke
must be held to have accepted the offer subject to
its express conditions. In order to be entitled to
the pension pro'uided in the plan, Menke must not
unZy have cumplied with each of these conditions,
but also the Board of Pensions must have so found.
The important question before the board was
whether Menke had established his continuous service in the employment of the company for 25 years,
and on this question the appellant is bound by the
decision of the board if fairly made. The authorities are uniform in holding in cases of this character that the decision of the administrative board,
where the pension plan so provides, is conclusive
upon the rights of an employee in the absence of
fraud or arbitrary action. See cases cited supra.
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The stipulations in pension plans for the decision
of questions arising on the rights of employees to
receive pensions are not unlike those often founJ
in construction contracts, making an engiHeer or
architect the final arbiter of disputes arising between the parties. Such stipulations are universally
upheld. Road Improvement Dist. No. 5 of Crittenden County, Ark., v. Roach, et al., 8 Cir., 18 F.2d
755, 759; Clark v. New England Telephone & Telegraph Company, supra; McCullough v. ClinchMitchell Construction Co., 8 Cir., 71 F.2d 17, 20,
21;McGregor v. J. A. Ware Construction Co., 188
Mo. 611, 87 S. W. 981, 984. The decision of the
Board of Pensions denying Mcnke's claim /'or a
pension is there! ore conclusive, to t:se the words of
this court in Guild v. Andrews, 8 Cfr., 137 F. :369,
371, 'in the absence of fraud or such gross mistakes
as imply bad faith or a failure to exercise an honest
juJgment'." (Emphasis ours.)
Also to the same effect is Going v. Southern Mill Employee's Trust, supra, at 763-64:

"* * * And where the terms of the plan
as prescribed by such employer provide that the de- ;
cision of the trustees appointed to administer such
plan shall be final and conclusive, the decision of
such trustees is binding on an employee claiming
benefits under such plan. In this connection, see
McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 322 App. iDv. 610,
53 N.Y.S. 98; Dowling v. Texas & N. 0. R. Co., ,
Tex. Civ. App., 80 S. W. 2d 456; Spiner v. Western
Union Telegraph Co., Tex. Civ. App., 73 S. W. 2d
566; Clark v. New England Telephone & Telegraph
Co., 229 Mass. 1, 118 N. E. 348; Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Robertson, 146 Ark. 406, 225 S. W.
649; Menke v. Thompson, 8 Cir., 140 F.2d 786; 56
C. J. S., Master and Servant, §§ 167-169.
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"We conclude that the provisions of the trust
agreement in question are binjing on, and determinative of the rights of, plaintiff who is asserting
the right to benefits thereunder, and that plaintiff
has not shown any right of recovery on his part
under such provision. The trial court therefore did
not err in sustaining the demurred to plaintiff's
evidence.
"Judgment affirmed."
In Webster v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 153 S. W. 2d 499
(Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1941), the conclusion was the same:

"[A] fund and plan established as was done
by the defendant in the case, constitutes a charitable
enterprise; that the .jefendant had the right to reserve to itself the manner in which the plan should
be administered; that the action of the committee
is final and conclusive and binding upon all its
employees and not subject to attack in the courts,
in the absence of an allegation and proof of fraud
or bad faith."
A Utah case supporting Respondent's position is Schov. Z. C. M. I., 85 Utah 281, 39 P.2d 342 (1934). This
Court held that after an employee had "completely performed" the conditions of the Plan, it ripenej into a contract. The Court discussed with approval several cases
which had denied recovery where the employee had not met
the prescribed conditions of the plan involved and quoted
the following language which has particular applicability
here:
field

"Whatever rights were acquired by the pensioners in this case were acquirej under the rules."

20
Moreover, Schofield also deals with the right of the Company to delegate the power to determine eligibility to a
board. In that case, the board found that the employee was
eligible and the Court held his rights thus became fixed.
Respondent herein merely seeks to apply the converse of
this doctrine - where the arbiter, here a doctor, has found
ineligibility, the employee is bound by such findings.
The cases are reviewed and summarized in Armotation, 42 ALR2d 461, 472-73 (1955) as follows:
"Private voluntary pension plans commonly
contain a provision whereby the company management, or boards set up for the administration of the
plan, have discretion to determine eligibility and
other matters under the plan, and it is usually provided that the decision in this respect shall be con
-elusive. The courts have usually held that such
grants of discretionary authority are effective and
binding upon persons claiming benefits so that the
decisions of the designated authority is not reviewable, at least in the absence of fraud."
Thus, in the instant case, Respondent had the right to
clothe a qualified doctor with power to determine total disability, and absent fraud or deceit, his determination was
conclusive on the parties. Certainly, if the doctor involved
had found that the disability was total, the Company woulJ
have been precluded from coming into court and questioning such opinion. We submit that mutuality is the touch·
stone in this situation and therefore Appellant is also bound
by the determination.
There has been no claim of bad faith, fraud or arbi·
trariness on the part of the doctors which might take this
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case out from under the general rules. To the contrary,
Appellant has had the benefit of three different doctors erlch having testified that Appellant was not totally disabled. There is not the slightest suggestion of bias and
prejudice and it is of some moment to note that Dr. Kuhe
acted on Appellant's behalf for he appealed to the Respondr.nt to re-employ Appellant because of his long record
with the company (Ex. 4-D). Certainly this testimony
corroborates the doctor's conclusion that Appellant was
able to work. In light of such evidence, the good faith and
soundness of the doctors' opinions cannot be seriously
questioned.
In concluding the argument on this point, Responjent
respectfully submits that since Appellant failed to satisfy
a fundamental condition precedent to qualify for the Plan,
he is precluded from recovery herein.
It might be noted in passing that even if we were to
assume, arguendo, and notwithstanding the formidable
authoritr to the contrary, that Appellant's reasoning has
applicability herein, nonetheless, total and permanent disability have not been shown. The Utah cases are clear that
disability from performing one's original employment is
not "total". See, Ralston v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 90
Utah 391, 62 P.2d 1119 (1936). Moreover, it has been held
that the assumption of a full time occupation (for example,
Appellant's tour of duty with the Youth Corps) precludes
a finding of total and permanent disability as of an earlier
date. See Couch on Insurance, 2d §53 : 130 ( 1966) . As
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noted, however, such authorities are necessarily inapposite
because this is not an insurance case.
POINT II
THE JURY'S ANSWERS TO THE SPECIAL
INTERROGATORIES ARE NOT INCONSISTENT BUT ASSUMING TO THE CONTRARY,
APPELLANT INDUCED THE AMBIGUITY
AND TOOK NO EXCEPTION THERETO.
In Point II of his brief, Appellant argues that the
jury's answers to the special interrogatories are "diametrically opposed" and thus a new trial should be granted.
In inte.ipreting special interrogatories, the words of
this Court in Pace v. Parish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273
(1952) are pertinent:

"Whenever there is uncertainty or doubt in connection with the correlation of interrogatories with
each other and their answers, they should be so in·
terpreted as to harmonize with the findings of the
jury if that can reasonably be done."
Appellant's specific concern is with Interrogatories No. 2
and 3, and the jury's answers thereto. In answering In·
terrogatory No. 2, the jury found that total disability had
not been established in the opinion of a qualified physician
appointed by the defendant. As previously noted, the facts
are not in dispute with regard to this, and certainly there
is no ambiguity concerning the jury's findings. However,
the Appellant argues that this is inconsistent with the an·
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swer to Interrogatory No. 3 in which the jury found that
"such total disability would be continuous throughout the
plaintiff's lifetime".
Apparently the Appellant seeks to convince this Court
that the answer to Interrogatory No. 3 controverts or modifies the answer to Interrogatory No. 2 upon which the
judgment of the Court is based. However, this problem is
not as critical as suggested by Appellant. It can be solved
by construing the word "such" in Interrogatory No. 3 with
the language in Instruction No. 1 which states: "Based
upon the definition of permanent and total disability given
you in these instructions" did plaintiff Steve Amicone become totally and permanently disabled. In Instruction No.
12, the Court informed the jury that permanent and total
disability has a specialized meaning in the law and this led
the jury to believe the conclusion of the doctors on total
disability were unimportant.
It is the duty of the Court, if possible, to construe the

Interrogatories to be consistent and to Jo this the word
"such" in Interrogatory No. 3 must be interpreted in the
light of the answer given to the first interrogatory. When
considered together, the answers returned by the jury must
mean that the disability, whether total within the specialized
meaning defined by the Court, or partial, as testified to by
the doctors, was fixed.
Such a construction is consistent with the facts in the
ren>nl since all of the doctors testified that the disability
Which Appellant complains about was not total. He had a

24
back injury, but obviously it would follow from the testimony that in the doctors' opinion, the disability was partial. True it is that the medical experts concluded the injury to the back was permanent. Certainly under the instructions, the jury was free to make its own determination of the percentage of disability even though the findings were contrary to the opinions of the medical experts.
But that has no bearing in the failure of Appellant to comply with the plan. They involve different questions and the
jury's conclusion that the disability was total and permanent means only that the fact-finders disagree with the
doctors. But disagreement between the jury and the doctor
does not equal inconsistency. All three answers can be permitted to stand and the judgment will be supported by
them.
Aside from the foregoing, the records bear clear and
convincing proof that if there was inconsistency in the in·
terrogatories, it was caused by Appellant's insistence on
having an erroneous theory submitted to the jury. The
only question involved in the case was whether the Appellant qualified for the plan and his counsel argued that the
jury should make that determination as he contended the
conclusions of the doctors were immaterial. Appellant succeeded in convincing the Court that regardless of Appellant's failure to meet the conditions, he was entitled to have
the jury determine his physical condition and his request
for instructions carried out that concept. Significantly,
counsel for Appellant must have been happy with the results he obtained for he failed to take any exceptions to
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the instruction or the interrogatories. The record shows
affirmatively that he was satisfied with the charge given
to the jury and under the after cited authorities, this precludes the raising of the question of inaccuracy or inconsistency on appeal (Tr. 132).
As this Court noted in Baker v. Cook, 6 Utah 2d 101,
308 P.2d 204 (1957):
"But defendant neither objected nor excepted
to the form of the questions and counsel cannot sit
by and permit the court to submit the propositions
and object if the verdict is unfavorable."
Again, in the later case of Hanson v. General Builders
Supply Company, 15 Utah 2d 143, 389 P.2d 61 (1964)
wherein the Appellant hau made a statement substantially
identical to that of Appellant's counsel herein, the Court
said:
"Under such circumstances the rules will not
justify or condone an expression by defendant of
satisfaction, - without a word of objection, with
che trial court's ruling as a matter of law as to the
question of liability, only to change its position
when it loses, otherwise it would have the enyiable
effect of permitting a litigant to blow hot and cold,
depending on the outcome of the verdict, and giving
him two trials instead of one. Had counsel said
nothing, the Coray case might be pertinent. Had
counsel excepted to the instruction, he would have
perfected his record. But having affirmatively expressed complete satisfaction with the court's action, defendants, in all fairness, are deemed to have
waived any automatic statutory exception."
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The same rules certainly apply with respect to special interrogatories. Since the Appellant did not object or express
dissatisfaction concerning the interrogatories, he is precluded from complaining of their effect. Baker v. Cook, 6
Utah 2d 161, 308 P.2d 2G4 (1957).
Equally clear is the fact that Appellant's failure to
except to Instruction No. rn. which embodied and mticulated Respondent's theory of this litigation, precludes any
question on appeal as to the propriety of the Court's judgment based upon such Instruction.
The trial court below was entitled to have the benefit of
Appellant's objections and exceptions at the time of trial.
Since Appellant failed to take timely exceptions, the in·
structions submitted became the law of the case, and under
such instructions, the judgment in favor of Respondent
was clearly justified.
POINT III
THE TRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN SUBMITTING
THE INTERROGATORIES AND INSTRUCTIONS TO THE .JURY AS THERE WAS NO
EVIDENCE TO JUSTIFY THEIR SUBMISSION.
In presenting this point, counsel for Respondent, must
of necessity repeat their assertion that the record affirma·
tively shows that all doctors who examined or treated the
Appellant testified that he was not totally disabled, and
there was no contradicting testimony. For that reason, the
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jury was compelled to answer Interrogatory No. 2 in the
negative. But the submission of the case to the jury was
error for the Trial Judge should have ruled as a matter of
law that Appellant was not entitled to recover. Boskovich
v. Utah Const. Co., 123 Utah 387, 259 P.2d 885 (1953)
As a predicate for his cause of action, Appellant alleged that he had fully compliej with all conditions and
provisions of the plan. Obviously, compliance with the conditions precedent was an essential element to plead and
prove.
At the conclusion of the testimony, Respondent made
a motion for directed verdict assigning, inter alia, the
following grounds:
"That the plaintiff has failed to prove by any
relevant and competent evidence that he is qualified
for retirement under the Jefendant's Retirement
Plan."
"That the plaintiff has failed to prove by any
relevant, competent evidence through a qualified
physician, appointed by Defendant who has formed
an opinion that plaintiff was permanently and totally disabled on or before the alleged date of J anuary 19, '65, or any time thereafter."
"That the testimony affirmatively shows that
all doctors who have examined the defendant have
expressed an opinion and furnished that opinion to
Kennecott Copper Corporation that the plaintiff is
not totally and permanently disabled."
This motion was denied erroneously and the question
was submitted to the jury but there was only one answer
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and this should have been known by the Trial Judge. The
error, of course, was in Appellant's favor and is thus not
a ground for his appeal.
CONCLUSION

In summary, Respondent respectfully submits that the
judgment in its favor should be affirmed. The basic theory
adopted by the trial court in entering judgment upon the
answers to interrogatories is supported by the applicable
law. Under a private, voluntary and non-contributory program, the Company may exact such conditions precedent
as it seems fit. The Appellant here failed to meet such conditions in that no qualified physician found him to be totally disabled - indeed, all testified that he could perform
numerous jobs. He, himself, proved his lack of disability
by satisfactorily performing a new job for a substantial
period - halted only by a new injury.
Appellant's protestations concerning the interrogator·
ies should be tempered by the fact that such errors, if any,
were self-induced and certainly not raised at an appropriate juncture.
Respectfully submitted,
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& LATIMER,
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